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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In many low income African countries, three factors are placing an undue burden on the 
elderly.  First, the burden on the elderly has enormously increased with the increase in 
mortality of prime age adults due to HIV AIDS pandemic and regional conflicts.  Second, the 
traditional safety net of the extended family has become ineffective and unreliable for the 
elderly.  Third, in a  few countries, the elderly are called upon to shoulder the responsibility of 
the family as they became the principal breadwinners and caregivers for young children.  
While a number of studies have examined the welfare consequences of these developments 
on children, few studies have systematically analyzed the poverty situation among the elderly 
(relative to other groups) in low income countries Africa, and the role of social pensions.  
This study aims to fill this gap.  
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Drawing on household survey information, the study has delineated the profile of the 
elderly for 15 African countries which include both East and West African countries, and 
countries with a high and low prevalence of HIV-AIDS pandemic.  
The findings show much heterogeneity across countries with respect to the proportion of 
the elderly population, the living arrangements and the composition of households, and 
household headship.  The variations in household types and living arrangements presumably 
reflect the variations in, and changing character of, the traditional family support system and 
household coping strategies in the wake of covariate shocks and the HIV-AIDS pandemic.  
However, the proportion of the single elderly is still very small in most countries.  A household 
type “elderly and children” or what is known as “skipped generation household” has emerged 
as an important structure in some countries.  In addition, “households headed by the elderly” 
has also emerged as a significant household type in several countries. 
The analysis shows that the poverty situation, and especially the poverty gap ratio, for the 
household types the elderly only, the elderly with children and the elderly-headed households 
is much higher than the average in several countries and the differences are statistically 
significant.  For example, in Malawi, Uganda and Zambia, the poverty gap ratio for various 
household types in which the elderly are living is 6 to 20 percentage points higher than the 
average (national) ratio. Likewise the poverty gap ratio among the elderly-headed households 
in 11 countries is higher than the national average.  Such differences are particularly large in 
rural areas.  However, it is worth stressing that the elderly are not always over-represented among 
the poor in every country: on the other hand the study finds,  for example, children in Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Nigeria are in a much worse situation than the elderly.  Careful identification 
of which particular group is in a dire situation requiring immediate social assistance calls for a 
critical analysis of the risk and vulnerability situation in each country, and a relative ranking of 
groups by risk and vulnerability – an analysis beyond the scope of this paper.  While the study 
finds the case for an universal social pension for all of the elderly to be weak, it does point to 
the need to consider a non-contributory social pension targeted to certain groups of the elderly. 
The study then examines the impacts on group-specific and national incidence of 
head count poverty and poverty gap ratios of providing a social pension for various 
categories of the elderly and explores its fiscal implications.  The analysis shows that the 
fiscal cost of providing an universal non-contributory social pension to all of the elderly will 
be quite high – 2 to3 percent of GDP, a level comparable to, or even higher, than the levels 
of total public spending on health care in some countries.  The study also notes that the 
case for such an universal social pension also appears to be weak even on welfare grounds 
inasmuch as there are other competing groups and claims on scarce safety net resources in 
some countries (such as families with many children) whose incidence of poverty is much 
higher than that of the elderly. 
Since such an universal social pension program is fiscally unaffordable and also cannot be 
defended on welfare grounds in some countries, the study explored the options for a targeted 
social pension with a fixed budget constraint (0.5 percent of GDP), and with a fixed benefit 
level (70% and 35% of the poverty threshold) for the elderly defined as persons 60+ and 65+.  
First, two household types, the elder living with children and the elderly-headed households 
were considered. A program of social pension targeted to these groups yields considerable 
reduction in the incidence of poverty and poverty gap ratio, for the particular groups targeted, 
and also at the national level.  The case for covering the elderly only also under the pension 
program appears strong because the impact of a pension for this group leads to significant 
reduction in the poverty gap ratio of the group. Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  3 
 
While categorical targeting of a pension for the above groups yields the maximum 
poverty reduction impacts, and is also fiscally sustainable even in low income countries, its 
operational feasibility is considered to be weak.  Moreover, targeting a social pension for such 
specific groups among the elderly is most likely to lead to adverse incentive effects and 
possible induced changes in household types in order to claim a pension.  Bearing this mind, 
two other simulations were done: impacts of a social pension for “all elderly” i.e., universal 
social pension, and “poor elderly”, i.e., a targeted social pension,  regardless of whichever 
household type they live in.  The simulation also assumes the realistic scenario that the 
pension is shared within households.   
Taking all things into account – the need to keep the fiscal cost low,  minimize adverse 
incentive effects, and maximize the poverty reduction impacts both at the national level and at 
the level of the targeted group, and bearing in mind the fact that there are other groups 
among whom the incidence of poverty is about the same or much worse than that of the 
elderly – the study concludes that the case for an universal approach is weak.  The best option 
appears to be to target the pension only to the poor among the elderly, keeping the benefit level 
low (say at about one-third of the poverty threshold), and eligible age limit at 65+.  The study 
underscores the need for more country-specific work to explore the feasibility of the 
recommended option in diverse country settings.   The availability of credible household 
survey information should enable one to assess the benefits and costs of various targeting 
approaches (simple means tests, proxy means tests, community targeting, self-selection, 
conditional cash transfers, etc.) in a given country situation, and help policymakers decide on 
an appropriate approach to targeting to identify the poor among the elderly for purposes of 
eligibility to a social pension.      
1  INTRODUCTION 
Demographic structures in Africa are transforming in an unique way, unlike in any other 
Region of the world.  Normal demographic change over time sees a rapid fall in mortality at 
birth and infancy, and rising life expectancy in later years arising from basic improvements in 
health care and rising living standards. These tendencies are prevalent in Africa too, though 
the risk of death among infants and the elderly is declining only slowly.  At the same time, 
conflicts and HIV/AIDS have increased the probability of death among prime age adults, 
generating apparent perversities in life expectancies at different ages. (R. Disney, 2003).   
The result has been that some of the elderly have become prime earning members for families 
and/or caregivers for grandchildren, either because prime age adults have died (or sick and 
dying) or migrated .  The Region has also witnessed an unprecedented increase in the number 
of orphans who have lost either one or both parents.  The welfare consequences of the 
growing number of orphans and vulnerable children have been analyzed.1  However, the 
economic and welfare consequences of the growing burden on the elderly in Sub Saharan 
countries have not been systematically analyzed from the perspective of the role of 
appropriate social protection instruments.  This study aims to fill this gap.   
The study has many objectives, and is organized as follows.  The second section (II) 
provides the context and the motivation for the study.  Section III provides a brief outline of 
the methodology; a detailed methodology is given in Appendix 1.  Drawing on the available 
recent household survey information, the profile of the elderly in 15 low income sub Saharan 4  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
African countries is delineated in section IV.  Three aspects of welfare are discussed:  poverty 
incidence, poverty gap ratio, and sickness and access to healthcare.  In section V the 
implications for poverty reduction of a social pension to the elderly under alternative targeting 
options are analyzed.  In particular, it will examine the short run impacts of providing 
assistance to the elderly (living in diverse household settings) to a reduction in the poverty 
among the elderly, as well as for national poverty reduction. Section VI contains a brief 
discussion of the education disadvantage, if any, of children living with the elderly.  The last 
section concludes, drawing some inferences for the role  of non-contributory social pensions 
for the elderly. 
2  THE CONTEXT AND THE MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
According to the UN estimate, nearly 10 percent of the world’s population, or over 600 million 
persons are over the age of 60, and this number is expected to double by 2050 (Schwarz, 
2003).  Nearly two-thirds of this elderly group live in the developing world where formal 
arrangements for old age support are few and far between, and the traditional arrangements, 
for reasons outlined below, seem to be on the decline particularly in Africa.   
Ageing diminishes the capacity to work and earn.  In much of Africa, the traditional safety 
net for the elderly is the extended family, especially their own children. As Schwarz (2003) 
points out, the extended family is not, and was never, a perfect safety net especially when their 
own children are too poor to support their parents.   Moreover, recent developments have led 
to older persons emerging as an increasingly visible vulnerable group.  While improvements in 
public health and immunizations have slowed the death rate among infants and adults  
(in some countries more rapidly than in others), conflicts and the spread of HIV virus have 
increased the number of deaths among prime age adults.   In countries devastated by the AIDS 
pandemic as well as other shocks (such as repeated droughts and conflicts), the hazard of 
death continues to be high not only early in life, and but also during the middle age.   As a 
result some countries are beginning to experience “skipped generation” households, where 
prime age adults are dead, and the responsibility of raising children has fallen on the elderly.    
Apart from the pressures imposed by the AIDS pandemic, changing patterns of 
urbanization and globalization have further exposed older persons to the risk of poverty.   
In some countries, the elderly have become the prime breadwinners and/or caregivers.  
The risk of poverty may be particularly high especially if older persons are engaged in the 
informal economy.  Whatever the underlying cause, changes in demographic structures in 
Africa may be rendering older persons vulnerable to poverty. 
The Social Risk Management (SRM) Framework enables one to look at an array of 
vulnerable groups including the elderly, children, the disabled and the like.  Towards this  
end, Risk and Vulnerable Assessments were carried out in some countries in order to better 
understand which groups are more vulnerable than others, which particular type of 
intervention for which specific vulnerable group makes sense in a given country, what is the 
best delivery mechanism and the country capacity to implement the program, and what are 
the fiscal implications for financing and sustainability of the intervention.  Recent Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessments have shown much heterogeneity with respect to the nature of risks 
and high risk groups and variations with respect to vulnerability of each group to poverty.  
While these assessments have drawn attention to high risk groups like women with many Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  5 
 
children, the disabled, chronically food insecure households, etc. , the prospects for the elderly 
deserve a little more attention than was possible in the Risk and Vulnerability Assessments 
largely because of the changing demographics, HIV-AIDS pandemic, the pace of urbanization 
and the gradual emergence of nuclear families – all contributing to a gradual erosion of the 
traditional safety net, viz., the extended family.   Given that most poor happen to be in informal 
sectors, the contributory pensions really don’t play a role in protecting the elderly in informal 
sectors.  As such, there is a need to consider the role of non-contributory pensions for the 
elderly, even if as a partial solution to the poverty among the elderly.    
Thus while there is a case for considering the role of non-contributory pensions for the 
elderly in Africa adopting the SRM framework, before launching any program it is important to 
know whether in fact the elderly are poorer than the average.  We need to know this because 
the objective of social assistance or any form of targeted transfer in most countries is not 
poverty reduction of specific vulnerable groups such as the elderly, but poverty reduction at 
the national level.  Given that the elderly live in extended families, whether or not the elderly 
are poorer than the average is not an easy question to answer.  We need to examine different 
household structures, and see whether specific household types where the elderly currently 
live experience a higher incidence of poverty than the national average in each country.  In 
most low income countries different vulnerable groups do compete for scarce social safety net 
resources.  Therefore, understanding the poverty situation of the elderly relative to average 
(national) poverty is  an essential starting point for a study of the role of non-contributory 
social pensions.    
The next section delineates the methodology adopted to assess the poverty status among 
the elderly, followed by empirical findings.          
3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The study will utilize the unit record household data sets from 15 African countries.  With the 
exception of three countries, the data sets belong to 1998-2001.2  Although the choice of the 
15 selected countries is governed by the availability of household survey information, the 
sample includes both western and eastern African countries, Francophone and Anglophone 
countries, and countries with a high incidence of the HIV-AIDS and others.  Thus, the sample 
countries are broadly representative of the whole of Sub Saharan Africa. 
A.  HOUSEHOLD CLASSIFICATIONS/METHODOLOGY 
The living conditions of the elderly will be assessed in relation to the average and other 
household types.   For purposes of this study,  children and the elderly are classified as follows:  
1.  Children from 0 to 14 years 
2.  Elderly males and females 60 years and older3 
3.  Elderly males and females 65 years and older 
 
The household type classification will be: 
1.  Households with no elderly persons 6  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
2.  Households with only elderly persons 
3.  Households with only children and elderly persons 
4.  Mixed households with children, working age persons and elderly     
5.  Households headed by elderly persons 
6.  Households headed by working age (15-59) males or females 
 
Households in groups 5 and 6 are sub-groups of household group 4. To analyze the 
poverty status of elderly, we will need a poverty line for each of the 15 countries.  The study 
uses national poverty lines. These poverty lines have been obtained from various poverty 
assessments.  These poverty lines do not take account of different needs of household 
members by age and sex. The poverty lines used in this study have been modified to take 
account of equivalence and household economies of scale. 
The study will focus on two poverty measures:4 
1. Head-count  ratio 
2. Poverty  gap  ratio 
 
These two measures are more than adequate to capture different aspects of poverty 
among the elderly. 
B.  POLICY SIMULATIONS 
The study analyzes alternative scenarios for targeting assistance to the elderly. We need an 
objective in order to be able to assess various scenarios. We decided that our objective will be 
to achieve a maximum reduction in the national poverty with a given fixed budget. Thus, our 
focus will be not only on the impact of social pension on poverty incidence among the elderly, 
but also on the poverty incidence at the national level.  Further, the study will assess the 
poverty reduction impacts of targeting social pension to different household types where the 
elderly are living, using a fixed budget of 0.5 percent of GDP in local currency, and a fixed 
benefit level equal to 70% and 35% of the national poverty threshold expenditure level. 
The study will consider the following targeting alternatives: 
1.  Perfect targeting (filling the gap) and  universal targeting (this is purely to serve as a 
bench mark, recognizing such perfect targeting is unrealistic in practice. 
2.  Targeting different household types: 
•  Targeting all elderly (regardless of household structure in which they live) 
•  Targeting elderly living alone  
•  Targeting elderly living with children 
•  Targeting only the poor among the elderly (regardless of household                     
structure in which they live) 
 Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  7 
 
The purpose of these simulations is to measure the impact of targeting on total poverty  
as well as on poverty among elderly and assess trade offs to alternative targeting options 
including fiscal (budgetary) implications.  For example, a program of social pension (with a 
given budget) aimed at all poor households regardless whether or not housing the elderly may 
have a significant poverty reduction impact but may not have a big dent on poverty among 
the elderly.  On the other hand a social pension program aimed at the elderly may substantially 
reduce the incidence of poverty of that particular group but may not contribute significantly 
to a reduction in the incidence of poverty at the national level, mainly because the share of the 
elderly recipients of the pension program (whether aged 60+ or 65+) in total population is 
small.  The study will evaluate these trade offs to alternative targeting scenerios, and will also 
compute  the targeting elasticity (i.e., the elasticity of total poverty reduction and elderly 
poverty reduction with respect to different targeting criteria).   
A detailed methodology is provided in Appendix 1. 
4  A PROFILE OF THE ELDERLY IN AFRICA.  
A.  THE SETTING: CHARACTERISTICS OF  SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
The study is based on recent household survey information for 15 low income Sub Saharan 
countries.  Details of the household surveys are provided in the Appendix.  Table 1 provides 
some background information on basic characteristics of these countries.   The sample 
countries include very low income countries with per capita incomes of $100 to slightly better 
off countries with per capita incomes close to $300.  Two countries in the sample have per 
capita incomes higher than $500.  The incidence of head count poverty ranges from a low 36.7 
per cent to a high 68.9 per cent.  The sample includes countries with a low incidence of HIV-
AIDS pandemic among young adults in the age group 15-24 (such as Guinea, Gambia and 
Madagascar) to countries with a high incidence (Malawi and Zambia).   There is also a wide 
range of variation with respect to primary school completion rates. Thus, although all 15 
countries are Sub Saharan countries, there is much heterogeneity across these countries with 
respect to levels of both economic and human capital development.    
B.  WHERE ARE THE ELDERLY? 
The elderly (defined as those above 60 years of age) range from a low 3.5 percent of 
population in Zambia to about 7 percent in Guinea (Figure 1).  The single elderly (i.e., the 
elderly living alone) constitute a very small percentage of the population in Africa, though 
there are significant inter-country variations.  In Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guinea, and Gambia the 
proportions are low (less than about 0.5%) but high in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria (Table 2).  It is 
hard to explain these differences, though one might not fail to notice the differences between 
West and East African countries.  Interestingly, while the share of the elderly in total population 
is high in some West African countries, the proportion of the elderly living alone is very small in 
these countries.   By contrast in many East African countries, the share of the elderly in total 
population is low (presumably because the life expectancies are low), but the proportion of 
the elderly living alone is somewhat higher, again presumably due to relatively high AIDS-
induced mortality of the middle-aged population.   It is worth stressing these statements are 
based on “eye balling” of the data presented in Table 2, and are not based on statistical tests 
(which are not possible with just 15 observations.) 8  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of sample countries 













        M  F  M  F   
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Burundi  100  7  61.2  5  11  41  42  43 
Burkina Faso  220  12  52.0  4  9.7  43  44  25 
Cote d'Ivoire  630  16  36.7  2.9  8.3  45  46  40 
Cameroon  580  15  60.9  5.4  12.7  48  50  43 
Ethiopía  100  66  40.9  4.4  7.8  41  43  24 
Ghana  290  20  43.6  1.4  3.0  55  57  64 
Guinea  410  8  38.1  0.6  1.4  46  47  34 
Gambia  320  1  62.2  0.5  1.4  52  55  70 
Kenya  350  31  49.7  6.0  15.6  46  47  63 
Madagascar  260  16  62.0  0.1  0.2  54  57  26 
Mozambique  210  18  68.9  6.1  14.7  41  43  36 
Malawi  160  11  63.9  6.3  14.9  38  39  64 
Nigeria  290  130  63.4  3  5.8  45  47  67 
Uganda  260  23  48.2  2  4.6  43  43  65 
Zambia  132  10  66.7  8.1  21  37  38  73 
Notes: Data for all columns except column 4 belong to the year 2001.  Column 4  provides the latest available 
estimate of the incidence of poverty, calculated by authors. 
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2003, and Authors’ calculations   
 
FIGURE 1 































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations from household surveys Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  9 
 
TABLE 2 
Population share by household type  












          1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Burundi   85.21  0.57  1.30  12.92  86.46  13.54 
Burkina Faso   58.86  0.26  0.43  40.46  74.38  25.62 
Cote d'Ivoire  74.93  0.40  0.39  24.49  82.07  17.79 
Camroon   69.72  0.41  0.47  29.40  81.13  18.83 
Etiopía  79.78  0.50  0.88  19.03  83.99  16.12 
Ghana   75.11  1.22  1.23  22.70  81.69  18.04 
Guinea  60.44  0.36  0.98  38.22  74.70  25.30 
Gambia   53.80  0.11  0.06  46.02  72.87  27.13 
Kenya  82.62  1.36  0.98  15.25  84.98  15.23 
Madagascar   84.89  0.67  0.64  13.78  88.08  11.61 
Mozambique  81.30  0.77  0.84  17.32  86.34  13.90 
Malawi   83.46  0.84  1.38  14.33  86.46  13.54 
Nigeria   79.41  1.27  0.80  18.61  83.30  16.82 
Uganda  78.16  0.89  1.34  19.83  83.16  17.08 
Zambia  83.83  0.46  0.39  15.33  87.52  12.48 
 
One of the consequences of high adult mortality (either due to AIDS or due to conflicts or 
both) is that the elderly may have become caregivers for children, in which case a household 
type of “elderly with children” becomes important.  Column 4 in Table 2 presents the 
percentage of population living in such households.   The proportion ranges from a low 0.06 
percent in Gambia to a high 1.34 percent in Uganda, 1.38 percent in Malawi, and 1.30 percent 
in Burundi. 5  It is worth noting that the household type “elderly with children” existed even 
prior to the AIDS pandemic with working age adults migrating to cities leaving children behind 
with elders in rural areas.   
Another household type that is of interest is “households headed by the elderly”.  These 
are households in which the elderly are the breadwinners with or without prime age adults 
living.  This is shown in the last column of Table 2.    Nearly a quarter of all households are 
headed by the elderly in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Gambia.  This proportion is between 11 to 
15 percent in Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia.  In the remaining countries the 
proportion varied between 16 to 20 percent.  
The above findings show much heterogeneity across countries with respect to the 
proportion of elderly population, living arrangements of the elderly, and household headship 
by age.  The variations in household types and living arrangements presumably reflect the 
variations in, and the changing character of, the traditional extended family system and 
household coping strategies across countries in the wake of the HIV-AIDS pandemic, regional 
conflicts and migration patterns.   10  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
B.  POVERTY AMONG THE ELDERLY (HEAD COUNT RATIO) 
We have seen in the previous section that the proportion of the elderly living alone is very low 
in all countries.  The elderly are living in extended families, or with grandchildren.  Moreover, 
the proportion of households headed by the elderly is large in some countries.  These 
characteristics of the living arrangements of the elderly have prompted us to consider three 
questions pertaining to differences in the incidence of poverty.  Is the incidence of poverty: 
a.  Higher in households where the elderly are living, compared with the average, 
b.  Higher in households where the elderly and children are living, compared with the 
average, and 
c.  Higher among households headed by the elderly compared with the average. 
(The head of the household is defined in the surveys as any person, male or 
female, at least 15 years old, who is regarded by other members of the household 
as their head, and who is generally the main breadwinner in the household.) 6 
d.  How statistically significant are these difference?  Are the patterns similar for the 
incidence of the poverty gap ratio?  These questions are explored below.  
The results for question (a) above presented in Figure 2.7  In eleven out of fifteen 
countries, the incidence of poverty among households in which the elderly are living (we call 
them “mixed households”) is higher than the average; in nine countries the differences  are 
statistically significant.  It is worth stressing that in Malawi and Zambia where the incidence of 
the HIV-AIDS is very high, the differences are very large and statistically significant. 
FIGURE 2 


























All Persons Mixed households
 
* Differences statistically significant at 5% or 10% level. 
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Figure 3 sheds light on question (b) above.  In ten out of fifteen countries, the incidence of 
poverty in households where the elderly are living with children (usually grandchildren) is 
higher than the average; the differences are statistically significant in eight countries, which 
include the three countries where the HIV-AIDS prevalence rates are high.  The finding seems 
to confirm the generally held impression that the incidence of poverty among elderly is 
exacerbated when they become caregivers for children.  In Malawi, Uganda and Zambia, 
households in which the elderly are living with children is 20 percentage points higher than 
the average and statistically significant.   
Question (c) is addressed in Figure 4.  In 12 out of 15 countries the incidence of poverty in 
households headed by the elderly is higher than the average; the differences are statistically 
significant in 11 countries.   
An interesting finding is that the “elderly living alone” are not worse off than the average 
except in Uganda and Zambia. (Figure 5)  In fact, in most countries the incidence of poverty 
among the single elderly is lower than the average.   In Uganda and Zambia, not only the 
proportion of single elderly is highest in Africa but also this group depicts a higher than 
average incidence of poverty.  It is worth noting, however, that while the incidence of head 
count poverty among the single elderly is not very different from the average in most 
countries, the depth of poverty among the single elderly is much higher than the average  
(see the discussion on poverty gap ratio below).   
FIGURE 3 



























All Persons Elderly & Children Only
* Differences statistically significant at 5% or 10% level. 12  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
FIGURE 4 












* Burkina Faso 













All Persons Headed by Elderly
* Differences statistically significant at 5% or 10% level. 
 
FIGURE 5 

























All Persons Elderly Persons Only
* Differences statistically significant at 5% or 10% level. 
 
One question that is of interest: is the incidence of poverty among children higher or 
lower than for the elderly?  Table 2 below gives the proportion of children in poverty, 
alongside the average for the whole population, and the proportion of elderly in poverty.   
The incidence of poverty among the elderly and among the children is about the same in most 
countries; the incidence of poverty among the elderly is more than 5 percentage points higher 
than that of children in Cote d’Ivore,  Malawi and Zambia.  On the other hand, the incidence of Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  13 
 
poverty among the children is more than 5 percentage points than that of elderly in 
Madagascar, Mozambique and Nigeria.  The pattern remains the same even when 
disaggregated by rural/urban location (tables not presented).     
The above findings strongly confirm the elderly disadvantage especially when the elderly 
have become either principal breadwinners for the family, or have become caregivers for 
children.  For most countries the differences between the above two groups of the elderly and 
the average for the whole population are statistically significant.  However, it is worth stressing 
that in every country it is possible to find groups whose welfare situation (defined as the incidence 
of poverty) may be a lot worse than that of the elderly.   For example, as can be seen from Table 3, 
children in Madagascar, Mozambique and Nigeria are in a much worse situation than the 
elderly.  Careful identification of which particular group is in a dire situation requiring 
immediate social assistance calls for a critical analysis of the risk and vulnerability situation in 
each country, and a relative ranking of groups by risk and vulnerability – an analysis beyond 
the scope of this paper.   Nonetheless, findings from the recently completed Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessments for three African countries are worth citing here.  In Ethiopia, all 
chronically food insecure households located in zones heavily exposed to droughts are highly 
vulnerable on average than most other households; in Kenya households exposed to periodic 
bouts of malaria and related health shocks, and those with little access to markets, are more 
vulnerable than others; in Burkina Faso, all households growing cotton which are subjected to 
both weather shocks and severe fluctuations in terms of trade, women who are subjected to 
onerous cultural practices, and girl children dropped out of school, are highly vulnerable.8   
TABLE 3 
Head count ratio by  individual types   
Country  Children 
0-14 years  All Persons  Elderly 
Persons 
Burundi 98  62.5  61.2  59.2 
Burkina Faso 98  54.5  52.0  56.3 
Cote d'voire98  39.1  36.7  46.7 
Cameroon 96  63.6  60.9  62.4 
Ethiopia00 41.6  40.9  43.7 
Ghana 98  47.0  43.6  45.5 
Guinea94 40.5  38.1  44.0 
Gambia 98  65.5  62.2  68.2 
Kenya97 53.5  49.7  53.8 
Madagascar 01  66.4  62.0  55.3 
Mozambique96 71.4  68.9  65.8 
Malawi 97  65.4  63.9  71.6 
Nigeria 96  66.6  63.4  59.5 
Uganda99 50.1  48.2  52.2 
Zambia98 67.8  66.7  79.4 
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C. POVERTY GAP RATIO 
From the perspective of an individual or household’s deprivation, poverty gap ratio is more 
instructive than head count poverty.9  In Table 4, we present the average income shortfall from 
the poverty line (i.e., absolute amount of poverty gap in local currency) as percent of the 
average poverty gap for the country as a whole, for different household types.  For example,  
in Burundi, the income shortfalls from the poverty line for the household type “elderly persons 
only” and “elderly and children” are 154 and 143 per cent higher than the national average 
income shortfall respectively.  From this table it is clear that there is much cross-country 
variation in the size of the gap for different categories of the elderly, relative to the average.  
Thus, the size of the gap among “elderly persons only”, is higher than the average in all 
countries except in Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nigeria.  When one considers “elderly with 
children” category, the size of the gap is higher than the average in all countries except in 
Gambia, Madagascar and Nigeria.  The size of the gap among households headed by the 
elderly is much higher than those not headed by the elderly, and the national average, in all 
countries except Burundi, Burkina Faso and Malawi where the differences are small.   
When we consider by household types, cross-country patterns in poverty gap ratio are 
similar to those observed for the head count ratio. (see Figure 6 – the absolute value of the 
poverty gap ratio are presented in Table 5).  Households with elderly and children show much 
higher poverty gap ratios than the average in 11 countries, and the differences (from the 
average) are statistically significant in 8 countries.   As with the head count ratio, the elderly 
disadvantage further worsens when we consider households headed by the elderly.  In 13 out 
of 15 countries, households headed by the elderly exhibit higher than average poverty gap 
ratios, and the differences are statistically significant in 11 countries.   
TABLE 4 
Income shortfall from the poverty threshold for different household types, as percent of average 
income short fall (poverty gap) for the country as a whole.  












Burundi   100  154  143  100  100  100 
Burkina Faso   100  113  116  100  99  100 
Cote d'Ivoire   93  213  224  95  121  100 
Cameroon   99  151  107  97  112  100 
Ethiopia   98  168  120  97  117  100 
Ghana   92  119  155  95  123  100 
Guinea   88  181  208  92  123  100 
Gambia   87  163  59  93  118  100 
Kenya   96  128  136  96  124  100 
Madagascar   101  96  99  101  93  100 
Mozambique   101  92  122  99  105  100 
Malawi   98  131  131  98  115  100 
Nigeria   96  57  97  98  112  100 
Uganda   99  185  151  98  109  100 
Zambia   95  171  189  95  135  100 
Note: The figures in the above Table are to be interpreted as follows.  If, for Burundi, the national poverty gap , i.e., 
income short fall from the poverty line in absolute quantity is 100, the income short fall for the household type 
“elderly and children” is 154 percent of the national average.  Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  15 
 
FIGURE 6 
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Burundi   26.2  27.0  33.6  23.1  26.2  24.3  25.9 
Burkina Faso   14.6  12.2  18.8  18.3  15.4  18.6  16.7 
Cote d'Ivoire  10.0  16.0  25.1  14.3  10.5  13.9  11.1 
Cameroon   22.6  23.8  21.1  25.3  22.5  27.3  23.4 
Ethiopia  9.9  12.1  10.7  11.0  9.9  11.4  10.2 
Ghana   14.4  12.0  22.3  19.8  14.9  18.9  15.7 
Guinea  10.2  13.0  21.7  14.0  10.9  14.3  11.8 
Gambia   20.9  24.7  11.8  31.0  23.7  30.6  25.6 
Kenya  17.1  15.9  21.6  21.0  17.1  21.2  17.7 
Madagascar   27.1  17.6  25.1  26.1  27.1  25.1  26.9 
Mozambique  29.4  19.2  31.9  29.8  29.2  31.3  29.4 
Malawi   26.5  25.6  33.7  29.6  26.5  30.5  27.1 
Nigeria   28.3  12.1  26.8  38.1  29.0  34.1  29.9 
Uganda  16.7  20.1  22.9  15.9  16.6  17.2  16.7 
Zambia  32.8  41.6  59.3  44.1  33.0  46.5  34.7 16  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
D.  RURAL/URBAN DIFFERENCES  
There are clearly significant rural/urban differences.  With respect to single elderly persons, a 
much higher proportion of individuals are poor in rural areas compared with urban areas in 
every country. (Figure 7)  The pattern remains the same for other household types, viz., 
households with elderly and children, and households headed by the elderly.  (The results are 
not presented.) The relatively higher proportion of poverty in rural areas among all these 
household types may be a reflection of the fact that rural poverty is generally higher than 
urban poverty in all countries.  
FIGURE 7 
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The pattern with respect to poverty gap ratio is the same as with the head count ratio.   
In particular, the size of the poverty gap ratio for households headed by the elderly in rural 
areas in most countries is extremely high compared with urban areas – these results are not 
presented here.  
5  SOCIAL PENSIONS FOR THE ELDERLY: IMPACTS AND COSTS  
A.  FISCAL COST OF FILLING THE POVERTY GAP AMONG THE ELDERLY 
We now examine the pros and cons of assisting the elderly with a social pension program.   
We proceed with the analysis as follows.   First, we look at the fiscal implications of the best  
of all options from the perspective of the elderly, viz., filling the poverty gap among different 
household types housing the elderly for typical low income countries of Africa.  The analysis in 
later sections is done with a fixed (hard) budget constraint (assuming a level of spending of Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  17 
 
0.5 percent of GDP), and a fixed benefit level (70% of the national average poverty 
threshold).   We then consider four different categories of potential beneficiaries:  a social 
pension to (a) all elderly individuals regardless of their income/wealth status; (b) elderly with 
children but with no prime age adults, (c) to poor among the elderly, i.e., those elderly who 
are living in households below the national poverty line, and (d) all households headed by 
the elderly.   The main purpose is to assess which targeting option makes sense, i.e., yields 
the maximum possible gains in national poverty reduction, with a given budget and with a 
given benefit level.   
The resources required (as per cent of GDP) to eliminate the poverty gap among all 
elderly women and men and others is shown in Table 6.  Compared with the cost of filling the 
poverty gap for other categories, the cost of filling the poverty gap for elderly men and women 
is not very high for most countries: as per cent of GDP it ranged from a low 0.1 percent in 
Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivore to a high of 0.6 of GDP in Zambia.   
TABLE 6  
Budget as % of GDP required to eliminate poverty gap by  age and gender 












Burundi   13.3  5.8 7.1 0.5  0.7  27.4 
Burkina Faso   1.5  0.7 0.8 0.1  0.1 3.2 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.7  1.3 1.0 0.1  0.1 4.2 
Cameroon   4.0  2.5 2.5 0.3  0.3 9.6 
Ethiopia  4.9  2.5 2.7 0.4  0.3  10.9 
Ghana   4.8  2.6 2.5 0.4  0.4  10.8 
Guinea  3.1  1.2 1.5 0.3  0.3 6.5 
Gambia   7.7  4.2 4.2 0.6  0.5  17.2 
Kenya  4.7  2.4 2.5 0.3  0.3  10.2 
Madagascar   4.8  2.7 2.7 0.2  0.2  10.6 
Mozambique  12.3  6.5 6.8 0.8  0.5  26.8 
Malawi   10.8  6.4 6.8 0.7  0.7  25.5 
Nigeria   4.9  3.6 3.5 0.4  0.2  12.7 
Uganda  4.7  1.9 2.0 0.3  0.3 9.2 
Zambia  10.0  6.2 6.4 0.6  0.6  23.8 
 
This estimate assumes that the pension is not shared with others in the household and, as 
such, is not realistic. This estimate assumes that the assistance is not shared in the household 
and as such, not realistic.  Most elderly live in households with others and any assistance is 
likely to be shared.       
Once we recognize the fact that the elderly live in extended families, we have to allow for 
the possibility that any assistance to the elderly will be shared by all in the family, eliminating 
the poverty gap of households in which the elderly live would  require a lot more resources 
(Table 7).  For example, in Burkina Faso, while individual poverty gap among the elderly can be 
eliminated only 0.2 percent of GDP, it would require twice as much for filling the poverty 
among the elderly with children, and thirteen times more resources for filling the poverty gap 
among elderly headed households.  Results are similar for other countries.  In ten out of 15 
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households headed by the elderly – clearly not affordable for most countries. Even to fill the 
poverty gap among the elderly with children – a small proportion of the population in all 
countries – the resources required ranged from 0.1 to 0.5 percent of GDP.  
TABLE 7 
Money as % of GDP required to eliminate poverty gap by  household type 












Burundi   23.44  0.24 0.51 3.24 23.71  3.72 
Burkina Faso   1.90  0.01 0.02 1.28  2.40 0.81 
Cote d'Ivoire  2.89  0.04 0.04 1.21  3.26 0.90 
Cameroon   6.56  0.06 0.05 2.89  7.53 2.02 
Etiopía  8.43  0.09 0.11 2.24  8.82 2.05 
Ghana   7.44  0.16 0.21 3.01  8.36 2.39 
Guinea  3.43  0.04 0.13 2.85  4.44 2.01 
Gambia   8.08  0.03 0.01 9.10 11.71  5.51 
Kenya  8.05  0.18 0.14 1.83  8.27 1.92 
Madagascar   9.04  0.07 0.07 1.39  9.39 1.14 
Mozambique  21.91  0.19 0.27 4.49 22.94  3.92 
Malawi   20.85  0.28 0.46 3.90 21.53  3.97 
Nigeria   9.70  0.09 0.10 2.83 10.34  2.39 
Uganda  7.16  0.15 0.19 1.73  7.52 1.71 
Zambia  18.91  0.19 0.17 4.49 19.77  3.99 
 
Considering that any program of social pension to fill the poverty gap of households with 
the elderly is fiscally unaffordable, we examine the implications of a social pension with a fixed 
budget constraint, and with a fixed benefit level, in the next section.  
B.  SIMULATION RESULTS WITH A FIXED BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND BENEFIT LEVEL   
The analysis in the following sections is carried out with two assumptions: (a) a hard budget 
constraint of 0.5% of GDP, and (b) a fixed benefit level equal to 70% of the national average 
poverty threshold.  In deciding on these thresholds, we relied on international experience.  
Thus in advanced OECD countries, total public spending on social security amounted to 2 to 3 
percent of GDP.  In India, the total expenditure on various safety net programs including old 
age pensions amounted to 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP.10  Brazil, Namibia and South Africa spend 1, 
2 and 1.4 percent of GDP respectively on old age pensions.   
Considering that (a) most sub Saharan countries have incomes much lower than low 
income countries of South Asia and Latin America, (b) there may be groups poorer and more 
vulnerable than the elderly competing for social safety net expenditures, and  given the 
demands on public spending from other priority sectors such as health and education, an 
expenditure level of 0.5% of GDP for non-contributory social pension may be considered the 
upper bound.  (In our sample fifteen African countries, the total public expenditure on health 
ranged 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP. )   As for the absolute level of the benefit, there is much 
variation across countries, and international experience is less helpful as a guide.  We work 
with 70% percent of the national average poverty threshold,  given the large income gap  Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  19 
 
(from the poverty line) for some critical vulnerable groups such as the elderly with children.  
These thresholds are meant to be illustrative, to understand the implications of targeting for 
various categories of the elderly.   Simulations can be done with other thresholds as well, 
depending upon the prevailing country situation with respect to poverty, fiscal affordability, 
and competing demands from other sectors.      
With a hard budget constraint of 0.5% of GDP, we assess the impact of providing a social 
pension to the elderly aged 60 and above living in various living arrangements.  The simulation 
assumes that though the pension is given to the elderly, it is shared within households. Results 
are presented in Table 8.  Significant (even dramatic) reduction in head count poverty 
incidence can be realized by targeting social assistance pension to all of the elderly living in 
various household types.    In 11 out of 15 countries, the impact on national poverty reduction 
of targeting social assistance pension to households with elderly and children (columns 4) is 
higher than what could be obtained by targeting it to the elderly only group (column 2). The 
poverty reduction impacts of targeting the household type “households with elderly and 
children” are particularly large in two countries devastated by AIDS, viz., Uganda and Malawi.  
It is worth noting, however, targeting this particular household type for social pension cannot 
solve the wider problem of orphans and vulnerable children because these children live in 
other household types as well.   
We now compare households headed by the elderly with those not headed by the elderly 
(the last four columns of Table 7).  The reduction in head count poverty accomplished by 
targeting the elderly headed households is certainly very impressive for that particular group.   
As for impacts on national poverty reduction, the impact is greater than targeting all of the 
elderly in ten out of fifteen countries (comparing column 8 and column 2).  We then compare 
the impacts of targeting by household headship.  In five out of 15 countries the reduction in 
national head count poverty is greater if the program is targeted to households headed by the 
elderly than for those not headed by the elderly.  The opposite is the case for 8 countries; and 
for two countries the differences in reduction of national poverty between targeting the two 
groups are small.    
The results are considerably different if one were to consider the impacts on poverty gap 
ratio, rather than head count poverty.  Table 9 reports results of the simulations with respect to 
impacts on the poverty gap ratio for households headed by the elderly, and those not headed 
by the elderly.   Unlike in the case of head count poverty, targeting all elderly headed 
households for a social pension results in a much more pronounced reduction in the national 
poverty gap ratio than if it were targeted to non-elderly-headed households.  What this clearly 
implies is that most elderly headed households have higher poverty gap ratios (i.e., their 
welfare condition is much worse) and so any assistance targeted to them reduces the poverty 
gap ratio substantially even if it does not enable them to cross the poverty line.  Though not as 
large, targeting households with elderly and children alone brings impressive reductions in the 
poverty  gap ratio in Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda – detailed results for impacts 
on the poverty gap ratio for various household types are shown in Appendix Table A4. 20  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
TABLE 8 
% change in Head count ratio of household type and national HC due to targeting .5% of GDP 
Households not headed 
by the elderly 
Household headed  














 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Burundi   -69.7 -0.4 -23.1 -0.3  -0.5  -0.4  -1.9  -0.2 
Burkina Faso  -100.0 -0.2 -100.0 -0.5  -2.1  -1.5  -3.6  -1.0 
Cote d'Ivoire  -100.0 -0.5 -100.0 -0.7  -2.5  -1.9  -22.1  -5.0 
Cameroon   -100.0 -0.3 -100.0 -0.3  -1.2  -1.0  -5.9  -1.3 
Ethiopia  -93.4 -0.5 -92.2 -0.8  -1.7  -1.4  -5.5  -1.0 
Ghana   -58.8 -0.5 -71.8 -1.2  -1.4  -1.1  -4.0  -0.8 
Guinea  -100.0 -0.4  -97.7  -1.5  -2.4  -1.7  -2.8  -0.8 
Gambia   -100.0 -0.1 -100.0  0.0  -1.4  -1.0  -2.3  -0.7 
Kenya  -66.3 -0.8 -99.1 -1.1  -1.4  -1.2  -7.5  -1.4 
Madagascar   -100.0 -0.5 -100.0 -0.6  -1.3  -1.2  -8.5  -1.0 
Mozambique  -76.4 -0.5 -77.8 -0.7  -0.3  -0.3  -3.4  -0.5 
Malawi   -60.9 -0.5 -46.0 -0.8  -0.6  -0.5  -2.1  -0.3 
Nigeria   -91.3 -0.6  -100.0  -0.8  -0.6  -0.5  -6.9  -1.2 
Uganda  -92.8 -1.0 -88.3 -1.6  -1.5  -1.3  -5.5  -0.9 
Zambia  -99.8 -0.5  -100.0  -0.5  -0.6  -0.5  -2.7  -0.4 
 
In summary, the simulations suggest that the gains in poverty reduction (both group-
specific and national) obtained by targeting a social pension to elderly-headed households 
and elderly and children groups, are much stronger than the gains in poverty reduction 
obtained by an universal pension to all of the elderly regardless of household types and 
poverty status.  However, implementing a pension program targeted to specific household 
types may pose enormous difficulties.  The potential for adverse incentive effects can be large.  
For example, if “single” elderly are targeted for a social pension, it is just possible an elderly 
person (a grandma or a grandpa) currently living in an extended family household setting 
might be “kicked out” to fetch a pension.  If a household type such as “elderly and children”  
are targeted, it is just possible extended family households might “adjust” their family 
structure to fit in with the category for which a pension is eligible.  Thus, while some of the 
household types with the elderly identified above are undoubtedly prone to higher levels of 
poverty than the average, targeting those specific categories might be difficult in practice.  
Bearing the above practical difficulties in mind, one could consider only two categories of 
the elderly regardless of which household setting they are living: all elderly persons, and all 
poor elderly persons (i.e., the elderly living in households living below the national poverty 
line.)  In the first the only requirement for targeting is an assessment of the “elderly status” of 
the person living in the household, and in the second case an assessment of the elderly status 
as well as the poverty status of the household would be required.  The household 
characteristics, including the categories identified above may be  good candidates for a social 
pension, and can be used to design a proxy means test to determine the poverty situation of 
the household.   Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  21 
 
TABLE 9 
% change in poverty gap of household type due to targeting .5% of GDP 
Not headed 
by the elderly 











  1 2  3  4 
Burundi   -1.3 -1.2  -8.3  -1.1 
Burkina Faso   -4.0 -2.9 -12.5  -3.4 
Cote d'Ivoire  -5.8 -4.5 -26.6  -5.9 
Cameroon   -4.1 -3.2 -17.8  -3.9 
Ethiopia  -2.3 -1.9 -11.0  -2.0 
Ghana   -2.6 -2.0 -10.5  -2.3 
Guinea  -4.2 -2.9 -10.4  -3.2 
Gambia   -2.5 -1.7  -6.7  -2.2 
Kenya  -3.0 -2.4 -15.3  -2.8 
Madagascar   -3.4 -3.0 -26.4  -2.9 
Mozambique  -1.5 -1.3  -8.9  -1.3 
Malawi   -1.5 -1.3  -9.5  -1.5 
Nigeria   -3.1 -2.5 -14.0  -2.7 
Uganda  -3.3 -2.7 -14.1  -2.5 
 
The simulations also assume that the pension, though delivered to the elderly person, is 
shared within the household – a realistic assumption in the African context.  The poverty 
reduction impacts of targeting to all elderly persons, all poor elderly persons, are shown in 
Table 10 (for head count poverty) and Table 11 (for the poverty gap ratio).11   As can be 
expected,  providing a social pension with resources equal to 0.5% of GDP only to poor elderly 
leads to almost twice as much reduction in national poverty than if the resources are spent on 
social pension to all of the elderly.  For example, in Burundi, whereas extending social pension 
to all of the elderly (60+) leads to 0.42% reduction in national poverty, it leads to 0.92% 
reduction if it were targeted to poor elderly.  Moreover, in the same country, targeting the 
program to all of the elderly (60+) seems (column 1) to be an inferior option (in terms of 
national poverty reduction impacts) compared with the option of devoting the same resource 
to all households whether or housing the elderly (column 5).  The results are similar for all 
countries, and for the poverty gap ratio.   
Tables 10 and 11 also contain simulations for the age group 65+.  Whether targeting 65+ 
group leads to a greater (lower) reduction in the incidence of national head count poverty and 
poverty gap ratio depends on the initial poverty situation of these two groups in each country.  
Thus in Burundi targeting a social pension to 65+ yields a greater reduction in national poverty 
than targeting it to persons 60+, and the opposite is true for Burkina Faso.  However, in 11 out 
of 15 countries, social pension targeted to the poor elderly aged 65+ yields a greater reduction 
in national poverty than targeting the pension to 60+.  The simulation results point to the 
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TABLE 10 
Percentage change in national headcount ratio by targeting .5% of GDP 
All elderly  Poor  elderly 
Country 
60 years+  65 years+  60 years+  65 years+ 
All persons 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Burundi   -0.42  -0.54  -0.92  -0.79  -0.48 
Burkina Faso   -1.63  -1.69  -2.99  -2.93  -1.44 
Cote d'Ivoire  -3.17  -2.60  -4.88  -3.34  -1.82 
Cameroon   -0.98  -1.51  -2.32  -2.41  -1.33 
Ethiopia -1.00  -0.98  -2.32  -2.24  -1.55 
Ghana   -0.78  -0.89  -2.07  -2.21  -1.01 
Guinea -1.44  -1.31  -3.49  -3.73  -1.15 
Gambia   -0.73  -0.84  -1.13  -1.25  -0.81 
Kenya -1.08  -1.06  -2.15  -2.14  -1.31 
Madagascar   -1.18  -1.37  -2.45  -2.16  -1.24 
Mozambique -0.44  -0.42 -0.66 -0.75  -0.37 
Malawi   -0.53  -0.54  -0.76  -0.77  -0.33 
Nigeria   -1.03  -0.91  -1.66  -1.90  -0.70 
Uganda -1.11  -1.18  -2.38  -2.45  -1.06 
Zambia -0.41  -0.46  -0.54  -0.61  -0.59 
TABLE 11 
Percentage change in poverty gap ratio  by targeting .5% of GDP 
All elderly  Poor  elderly 
Country 
60 years+  65 years+  60 years+  65 years+ 
All persons 
  1  2 3 4  5 
Burundi   -0.92  -0.91  -1.46  -1.39  -1.14 
Burkina Faso   -2.78  -2.56  -4.25  -3.53  -3.08 
Cote d'Ivoire  -3.99  -3.16  -5.34  -3.59  -4.90 
Cameroon   -2.92  -2.71  -4.23  -3.45  -3.38 
Ethiopia -1.71  -1.62  -3.34  -2.81  -1.92 
Ghana   -1.88  -1.83  -3.75  -3.42  -2.06 
Guinea -2.97  -2.85  -5.89  -4.75  -3.01 
Gambia   -1.87  -1.73  -2.65  -2.45  -1.85 
Kenya -2.16  -1.99  -3.55  -3.08  -2.50 
Madagascar   -2.06  -1.78  -3.00  -2.12  -2.99 
Mozambique -1.10  -1.05 -1.62 -1.51  -1.32 
Malawi   -1.27  -1.22  -1.73  -1.66  -1.29 
Nigeria   -2.05  -1.72  -3.18  -2.55  -2.54 
Uganda -2.26  -2.18  -3.76  -3.25  -2.70 
Zambia -1.52  -1.46  -1.88  -1.78  -1.45 
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Another way to assess the superiority (or lack thereof) of targeting the poor elderly versus 
all elderly, and various household structures in which the elderly are living, is to compute the 
targeting indicator (see Appendix for methodology).  This is done in Tables 12.  If the 
computed targeting indicator is greater than 1, then the same amount of budget targeted to 
that group as social pension will result in a greater reduction in national poverty than 
universal targeting (i.e., providing universal benefit of social assistance to all households).   
The results show that targeting a social pension to the poor elderly 65+ is the best option in 
every country, compared with the policy of an universal social pension to all of the elderly; 
moreover in 9 countries, the impacts in poverty reduction are stronger if the eligibility is 
restricted to 65+ rather than 60+.  
TABLE 12 
Targeting indicator : Impact on Headcount ratio 
All elderly  Poor  elderly 
Country 
60 years+  65 years+  60 years+  65 years+ 
All persons 
Burundi   0.88  1.12  1.93  1.65  1.00 
Burkina Faso   1.14  1.18  2.08  2.04  1.00 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.74  1.43  2.67  1.83  1.00 
Cameroon   0.74  1.14  1.75  1.81  1.00 
Ethiopia 0.65  0.63  1.50  1.44  1.00 
Ghana   0.77  0.88  2.05  2.19  1.00 
Guinea 1.25  1.13  3.02  3.24  1.00 
Gambia   0.90  1.04  1.39  1.53  1.00 
Kenya 0.82  0.81  1.64  1.63  1.00 
Madagascar   0.95  1.10  1.98  1.74  1.00 
Mozambique 1.21  1.16  1.80  2.04  1.00 
Malawi   1.60  1.62  2.28  2.31  1.00 
Nigeria   1.48  1.30  2.38  2.72  1.00 
Uganda 1.04  1.11  2.24  2.30  1.00 
Zambia 0.69  0.78  0.91  1.04  1.00 
 
We now replace the fixed budget constraint with a fixed benefit level.    If the objective 
were to provide a social pension equal to 70% of the national average poverty threshold to all 
elderly, and to poor elderly, (a) how much does this cost, and (b) what are its poverty reduction 
impacts.  The results are summarized in Tables 13 and 14. 
Two findings are worth stressing.  First, it is a very expensive policy and most countries 
of Africa may not afford.  Even if one were to take the poor among 65+ as the target group, 
for most countries the fiscal cost would be higher than 0.5%, and in some countries it is close 
to 1% of GDP or more (Table 13).  It is very doubtful if this level of spending on an universal 
social pension program for the elderly is justifiable on welfare grounds especially in countries 
where there may be other groups who may be poorer and more vulnerable on average than 
the elderly.    24  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
TABLE 13  
Cost of social pension (70% of poverty Threshold) as % of GDP 
All elderly  Poor elderly 
Country 
60 years +  65 years +  60 years +  65 years + 
Burundi    3.05 2.09 1.81 1.26 
Burkina Faso   2.11  1.39  1.19  0.79 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1.11 0.69 0.52 0.33 
Cameroon    1.55 0.96 0.97 0.63 
Ethiopia  3.74 2.36 1.63 1.03 
Ghana    3.30 2.29 1.50 1.04 
Guinea  2.66 1.62 1.17 0.72 
Gambia    2.83 1.89 1.93 1.24 
Kenya  2.06 1.42 1.11 0.76 
Madagascar    1.15 0.72 0.64 0.40 
Mozambique  2.92 1.75 1.93 1.15 
Malawi    3.13 2.18 2.24 1.55 
Nigeria    1.68 0.99 1.00 0.55 
Uganda  1.86 1.27 0.97 0.69 
Zambia  1.68 1.06 1.33 0.84 
 
One way to make the social pension affordable is to lower the benefit level, means-tested 
(restricted to the poor elderly), and eligibility restricted to 65+. If one were to fix the benefit 
level at 35% poverty threshold, the budgetary cost would be exactly equal to one half of the 
reported results.   For example, in Zambia, with a benefit level of one-third of the poverty 
threshold, and eligibility threshold restricted to 65+ and the pension means-tested and 
restricted to the poor, the cost would drop to 0.42 percent of GDP, abstracting from the 
administrative cost of means testing.  Provided the administrative cost of means-testing is not 
large, this level of spending may be affordable even in low income countries with a high 
incidence of poverty.  
Second, the program (if targeted to the poor elderly) would significantly reduce the 
national (head count) poverty ratios (Table 14) even with a benefit level of 35% of the poverty 
threshold.   Though we have not shown the results, the impacts on the reduction in the 
national poverty gap ratio is also impressive and in the same direction  
Caveats and Limitations:  While the above simulations do cast doubts on the fiscal 
affordability and desirability (on welfare grounds) of universal social pensions for the elderly, 
and underscore the gains in targeting social pensions to those most in need,  more work is 
needed to assess the administrative costs and feasibility of implementing a means-tested social 
pension.   Second, the potential adverse incentive effects also need to be taken into account 
while designing even a targeted social pension program.    From the perspective of avoiding 
such adverse incentive effects and potential (artificial) changes in household types and 
compositions in response to a social pension program targeted to a specific household type, it 
appears preferable to target the pension to all poor elderly i.e., all poor households in which 
the elderly live, for the pension benefit. 12   In brief, while there is a case for targeted non-Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  25 
 
contributory social pensions for the elderly from a (national) poverty reduction stand point, 
caution is needed in selecting the right targeted approach while operationalizing a social 
pension policy.13   
TABLE14 
Percentage change in national headcount  by  targeting assistance equal to 70 % and 35%  
of average  poverty line to poor elderly 
Poor Elderly 60 +  Poor elderly 65 + 
Country  Pension = .70% of 
Poverty threshold 
Pension = .35% of 
Poverty threshold 
Pension = .70% of 
Poverty threshold 
Pension = .35% of  
Poverty threshold 
Burundi   -2.98  -1.49  -1.96  -0.98 
Burkina Faso   -5.72  -2.86  -3.78  -1.89 
Cote d'Ivoire  -4.92  -2.46  -3.07  -1.53 
Cameroon   -4.59  -2.29  -2.91  -1.45 
Ethiopia -5.16  -2.58  -3.28  -1.64 
Ghana   -6.06  -3.03  -4.18  -2.09 
Guinea -7.28  -3.64  -4.57  -2.28 
Gambia   -5.56  -2.78  -3.61  -1.80 
Kenya -4.68  -2.34  -3.11  -1.50 
Madagascar   -3.13  -2.56  -1.90  -0.95 
Mozambique -3.66 -2.33 -2.12  -1.06 
Malawi   -4.41  -2.20  -3.02  -1.50 
Nigeria   -4.07  -2.03  -2.14  -1.07 
Uganda -4.45  -2.22  -3.13  -1.56 
Zambia -2.43  -1.21  -1.51  -0.75 
 
The choice between keeping the eligibility for a social pension universal versus keeping it 
means-tested is much debated in the literature.   This study extends the debate by introducing 
the poverty reduction impacts of various options.  The main finding is that with a budget limit 
of 0.5 per cent of GDP – a fiscally sustainable cost for most countries – if one were to choose 
65+ as the cut off point for eligibility, targeting (and means-testing) the pension to the poor 
among the elderly, rather than rendering the eligibility universal, appears to yield the best 
possible results in poverty reduction of both the elderly in need and for national poverty 
reduction. In other words, bearing all factors into consideration, the case for universal 
untargeted social pensions for the elderly appears rather weak.  Perhaps with a higher age cut 
off point, say 75+, it might be possible to render eligibility universal and also keep the fiscal 
cost within the 0.5 percent of GDP for most countries, but then the benefits of the social 
pension will be so limited in scope as to be almost inconsequential in terms of poverty 
reduction of the majority of the elderly and on national poverty.  On the other hand keeping it 
universal with an eligibility cut off at 60+ will be unjustifiable on welfare grounds, apart from 
being fiscally so expensive as to be unsustainable for most countries.   
It is often asserted that considerations of fiscal sustainability are far fetched because they 
ignore the potential for economic growth in these low income countries.   Simulations done by 
Smith and Subbarao (2003) show that  typical low income countries, even to keep the absolute 
number of the poor constant, need to grow at 5 to 7 per cent per annum, whereas the actual 
(realized) growth of GDP for most low income African countries was less than 3 per cent per 26  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
annum in the recent past.  This suggests that the fiscal leverage from economic growth is likely 
to be extremely limited, if not nil, for low income countries of Africa in the medium term, and 
so the argument that universal social pensions can sustained in a “growth scenario” is 
tenuous at best.   
In sum, it appears desirable, in the larger interest of the elderly themselves, to target the 
pension to the poor among the elderly keeping the age cut off at 65+, and encourage country-
specific work on the feasibility of creative and cost-effective approaches to targeting.   
As pointed out by Coady, Grosh, Hoddinot (2004) in their survey of approaches to targeting,  
often a single cross-section household survey would be enough to assess the costs and 
benefits of various approaches to targeting (simple means tests, proxy means tests, 
categorical, self-selection, community targeting) in a given country situation.  This survey also 
notes that often it should be possible to combine different approaches: in this case a social 
pension to the elderly above 65 years of age (categorical) could be combined with means 
testing (individual assessment), and if the benefit level is kept low enough to be unattractive to 
the non-poor was done in Nepal,14 it could induce self-selection as well. In addition, recent 
innovations in delivery such as imposing conditions for the receipt of transfer can avoid  
adverse incentive effects and leakages. 
6  CHILDREN WITH THE ELDERLY: ARE THEY WORSE  
OFF OR BETTER OFF? 
As noted at the beginning of the paper, one of the consequences of AIDS pandemic has been 
that the elderly, especially grandparents, have become caregivers of children in many 
countries.  (Subbarao and Coury, 2004) In Uganda, Malawi and Zambia, close to one out of five 
children now live with the elderly.   One important question that is worth examining is whether 
children living the elderly headed households, or living with elderly only, suffer from education 
disadvantage, compared with the average, and compared with children living with households 
with no elderly. 
To address the above question, we fitted a logit with the dependent variable, a dummy, 
which takes 1 if the child is in school and 0 if not in school.  Independent variables include 
household welfare measured by the household’s per capita expenditure divided by the 
poverty line, a dummy variable for elderly-headed households and a dummy for urban/rural 
residence.   This is not a completely specified model of the determinants of schooling; that is 
not our objective.   Our purpose is limited to assessing the specific disadvantage, if any, 
suffered by children if they happen to be living in a particular household environment.  
Because of the limited nature of this specification, the model results cannot be used for 
answering the wider question of all the factors governing a child’s schooling.  Results are 
reported in Table 15 for male children and Table 16 for female children.   
The results reported in Tables 16 and 17 are the elasticity of probability of male and  
female children attending school.  In Burundi, if per capita welfare improves by 1%, the 
probability that a male child attend school will increase by 0.27 per cent with a highly 
significant t value.  Thus, in richer households, a greater percentage of male children go to 
school – a very plausible and predictable result.  The elasticities with respect to elderly-headed 
dummy are significant and positive in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda.  In other words, in 
these three countries, if children shift from non-elderly headed households to elderly-headed Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  27 
 
households, the probability of male children attending the school increases.  As can be 
expected, in urban areas the elasticity is generally positive and high in all countries, implying 
that male children in urban settings are most likely to attend schools.  It also implies that the 
potential adverse impacts on schooling is nil for male children living with the elderly. 
TABLE 15 
Elasticity of probability of male children attending school 
Country  Welfare 
Elasticity  t-Value  Elderly head 
Elasticity 
t-Value  Urban areas 
Elasticity 
t-Value 
Burundi 0.2674  10.7  -0.0034  -0.6  0.0154  3.8 
Burkina  Faso  0.1620 8.0 0.0015 0.2 0.1920  25.9 
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.2543 9.8 -0.0047 -0.7 0.1535 10.9 
Cameroon  0.0437 2.0 0.0338 3.9 0.0235 1.8 
Ethiopia  0.1467 6.0 -0.0005 -0.1 0.1470 27.9 
Ghana  0.1019 8.5 -0.0019 -0.8 0.0310 5.9 
Guinea  0.3465 9.0 -0.0076 -0.6 0.3045 18.3 
Gambia,  The  0.0452 1.8 -0.0120 -0.8 0.0620 2.8 
Kenya  0.0120 2.2 -0.0042 -2.6 0.0027 1.5 
Madagascar  0.1017 7.2 -0.0021 -0.9 0.0137 2.7 
Mozambique  0.1277 7.8 0.0024 0.4 0.0631 8.4 
Malawi  0.0378 3.0 -0.0067 -1.6 0.0164 3.4 
Nigeria  0.0149 1.8 0.0317 7.4 0.1505  16.7 
Uganda  0.0999  11.9  0.0071 3.6 0.0046 2.1 
Zambia  0.1039 11.6 0.0026  0.9  0.0913 14.8 
 
The results are quite the opposite for female children in some, but not all, countries.   
In Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Guinea, the probability of female children 
not attending the school increases when they shift from non-elderly headed to elderly headed 
households.  The opposite is the case in Cameroon, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia.  In other 
words, in these four countries, female children living in elderly homes do not suffer from 
schooling disadvantage.  
The policy conclusion of this very limited exercise is very simple and straightforward, viz.,  
it is important to be aware of gender differences in schooling outcomes when children are 
looked after by elderly-headed households.15   While our study does not offer a conclusive 
proof, a social pension targeted to poor, elderly-headed households may have the potential for 
reducing the female disadvantage in schooling.  More work is needed for understanding the 
gender impacts of a social pension program. 28  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
TABLE 16 
Elasticity of probability of female  children attending school 
7  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY. 
The main objective of the study is to delineate the poverty among the elderly in 15 low income 
Sub Saharan countries and to assess the role of social pensions for the elderly.  The study finds 
that, when defined by household structure, the elderly only, elderly with children, and the 
elderly-headed households are poorer than others in eleven out of fifteen sample countries.   
In four countries, groups other than the elderly seem to be at a higher risk of poverty, such as 
children and families with many children.  Thus, while certain groups of the elderly 
undoubtedly face a greater risk of being poor, the elderly as a whole do not seem to be over-
represented among the poor.   The findings suggest that even in the eleven countries where 
certain categories of the elderly happen to be at a higher risk of poverty, the case for an universal 
social pension for all of the elderly is weak both on welfare grounds, and on considerations of fiscal 
affordability.  For example, for a typical country considered in our sample, an universal social 
pension for all of the elderly above 65 years of age would cost about 2  per cent of GDP, a level 
comparable to, or higher than, the current levels of spending on health care.  Increasing the 
age cut-off to 70+ or 75+ might lower costs, but few would be eligible for the pension, and it 
would have little impact on poverty reduction at the national level.    
The study finds, however, that there is a case for a non-contributory social pension to 
some of the elderly in all countries.    Further detailed analysis and simulations suggest that 
from the perspective of maximum impacts on reduction in poverty among the poor elderly, 
and for national poverty reduction, there appears to be a need for a non-contributory 
pension program restricting the eligibility to the poor among the elderly.   Considerations of 
affordability and fiscal sustainability suggest that it is best to limit the benefit level to about 
Country  Welfare 
Elasticity  t-Value  Elderly head 
Elasticity  t-Value  Urban areas 
Elasticity  t-Value 
Burundi 0.2946  10.8  -0.0259  -3.9  0.0262  5.6 
Burkina  Faso  0.1848 8.2 -0.0580 -4.0 0.2494 27.6 
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.2010 7.3 -0.0140 -1.8 0.2001 11.0 
Cameroon  0.0701 2.6 0.0383 3.7 0.0516 3.4 
Ethiopia  0.1985 6.9 0.0087 1.4 0.2075  32.8 
Ghana  0.1046 7.4 -0.0119 -4.2 0.0227 3.7 
Guinea  0.4070 9.3 -0.0344 -1.7 0.4465 17.2 
Gambia,  The  0.0861 3.0 0.0221 1.3 0.0488 1.9 
Kenya  0.0487 6.1 0.0012 0.7 -0.0016  -0.9 
Madagascar  0.0666 4.6 -0.0011 -0.4 0.0127 2.2 
Mozambique  0.2235 10.2 0.0031  0.5  0.0952 10.5 
Malawi  0.0200 1.8 -0.0004 -0.1 0.0101 2.1 
Nigeria  0.0002 0.0 0.0350 6.9 0.2308  22.3 
Uganda 0.1334  15.0  0.0096  4.6  -0.0021  -1.0 
Zambia  0.1257 12.9 0.0056  2.1  0.1163 17.5 Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  29 
 
one-third of the poverty threshold, eligibility age threshold to be 65+, and explore 
alternative non-income-based methods of targeting to restrict the pension only to the poor 
among the eligible elderly (i.e., 65+).   
A targeted approach has undoubtedly some limitations.  Even the best targeted approach 
entails an irreducible element of randomness that leads to inclusion and exclusion errors.16  
Fortunately, several recent innovative approaches in targeting including proxy means tests 
coupled with conditional transfers offer much scope for reducing the errors in targeting, 
especially since most African countries now have at least one large, nationally representative 
household survey in the post-HIV AIDS period (around the year 2000). 17  Moreover, recent 
project experience with providing cash assistance to families hit by drought in Ethiopia, or to 
families supporting orphans in Burkina Faso, suggests that community-driven approaches can 
be successful in reaching the needy in Africa.18  Given the heterogeneity of the situation of the 
elderly across the fifteen countries, more country-specific work is needed to explore 
administratively feasible, cost-effective, and non-income-based targeting options.   30  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
APPENDIX  1 
METHODOLOGY 
Suppose we want establish a social assistance program (targeted either to the elderly as a 
social pension, or a conditional grant to children or to any other identified vulnerable group) in 
a poor country. Since the resources available to the country’s government are limited so our 
scheme should be such that it should lead to a maximum reduction in aggregate (national-
level) poverty. To achieve this objective, we first need to fix a poverty measure, which we want 
reduce. In the literature, there exist many poverty measures, which indicate different facets of 
poverty. Focusing on a single poverty measure may not be desirable. Our study will focus on 
three poverty measures: 
 
1. Head-count  ratio 
2. Poverty  gap  ratio 
3.  Severity of poverty 
 
These three measures are more than adequate to capture different facets of poverty 
among vulnerable groups including the elderly. All the measures belong to a single class of 
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where x is the income or expenditure of a person, which is a random variable with density 
function f(x) and z is the poverty line. P(z, x) is a homogenous function of degree zero in z and x 
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Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) proposed a class of poverty measures that is obtained 
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in (1), where α  is the parameter of inequality aversion. For  H = = θ α   , 0 , that is, the headcount 
ratio. This measure gives equal weight to all poor irrespective of the intensity of their poverty. 
For α =1, each poor is weighted by his or her distance from the poverty line relative to z. This 
measure is called the poverty gap ratio. For α  =2, the weight given to each poor is proportional 
to the square of his or her income shortfall from the poverty line. This measure is called the 
severity of poverty ratio.  
EXACT TARGETING 
The class of poverty measures given in (2) is basically a function of income shortfalls of all 
individuals from the poverty line. The income shortfall is positive for all poor and zero for all 
non-poor. It is obvious that an optimum assistance scheme will be the one, which gives money 
to the poor proportional to their income shortfall. Suppose p(x) is the pension that is given to a 
person with income x, then our pension scheme will be given by 
 
P(x) = k(z-x),  if  x<z               
       = 0, if x ≥  z                             (2) 
 
where k lies in the range   1 0 ≤ < k . The per person cost of this pension scheme to the society 
will be given by 
 
*) ( µ − = z kH c  
 
where  * µ  is the mean income of the poor. k is determined from how much the society can 
afford to pay this cost. Suppose for example, a country can afford to spend  ρ 100  percent of its 
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where N is the population of the country. If k=1, then poverty is completely eliminated in the 
country within one year. If a country can afford to eliminate poverty within one year, should it 
do it? This scenario may sound very attractive, but there is one serious problem. The parameter 
k is closely related to an incentive effect of poverty reduction. Suppose a pensioner earns an 
extra dollar of income, then his or her pension will reduce by k dollars, the net benefit of 
earning one dollar of income to the pensioner will be (1-k) dollars. If k=1, then the pensioner 
will gain nothing by working. As a matter fact, he or she may stop working completely and 
receive the maximum benefit of (z-x) dollars. This may lead to a reduction in the country’s GDP 
resulting in lower affordability. The smaller is the k, the greater will be the incentive for the 
poor to work. This kind of pension scheme is in operation in some developed countries such as 
Australia but value k is kept at a level much lower than 1. 
What is the cost (as percentage of GDP) that will eliminate poverty completely? This can 
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where PGDP is the per capita GDP. This cost can be calculated for any type of vulnerable group 
such children, elderly and so on. The total cost of eliminating poverty in the whole population 
will be equal to sum of the costs of eliminating poverty in individual groups. 
The targeting schemes presented in this section may be called exact targeting because 
they provide benefits to each individual proportional to his or her income shortfall from the 
poverty line. These schemes can be more readily implemented in the rich industrialized 
countries, where most of the earning activities take place in formal sectors of the economy. 
These schemes will not be operational in developing countries, which have large informal 
sectors, where it is not possible to identify accurately people’s incomes. In these countries, we 
need to design universal targeting pension schemes. 
UNIVERSAL TARGETING 
In the universal schemes, we give the same benefits to all individuals who satisfy certain   easily 
identifiable criteria. For instance, we may give pensions to elderly persons who have to support 
children or we may give pensions to those who are handicapped, or conditional grants to poor 
families with children currently not in school.   In this section, we present designing of such 
schemes with a major objective of reducing aggregate national-level poverty.  
First, we attempt to answer the question: what will be the percentage reduction in 
poverty when we give everyone in the population one unit of a country’s currency? To answer 
this question, we first need to choose a poverty measure. Let us first focus on the entire class of 
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If we assume that everyone gets the same benefit, dx(p) will be the same for everyone, 
then equation (4) can be written as  
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θ η  is the percentage change in poverty when we give everyone one unit of the country’s 
currency.  θ η  will always be negative because poverty will always decrease when we give 
positive benefits to people. We may call  θ η  as the absolute elasticity of poverty.  
Note that the absolute elasticity changes over time, so we denote  t θ η  as the absolute 
elasticity in year t.  Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  33 
 
Suppose a government spends  ρ 100 percent of its GDP on pensions for the elderly, then 
the money available per person will be  N GDB / × ρ , which if given to everyone will change the 
aggregate poverty between year t-1 to year t by  t PGDP θ η ρ × × 100  percent (PGDP is the per 
capita GDP). Thus, we have the relationship: 
                                           
) 1 ( 1 t t t PGDP θ η ρ θ θ × × + = −            (6) 
 
Suppose  0 θ is the poverty level in the base year, then equation (6) will allow us to 
compute the incidence of poverty in any year.  
Equation (6) allows us to measure the long-term impact of the universal pension (or any 
other social assistance) scheme on poverty. However, the economy does not remain static over 
time. The per capita GDP changes every year. The poverty will reduce over time because of two 
factors: first growth increases people’s income and secondly more money is available to 
people every year through increases in pension (social assistance). 
Let us assume that the per capita GDP is growing at an annual rate of 100g percent. 
Suppose further that growth process is such that everyone gets the same proportional 
benefits or in other words everyone’s income is increasing at the same rate of 100g percent, 
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which gives   
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as the growth elasticity of poverty (Kakwani 1993). 
Note that growth elasticity is always negative because poverty decreases when everyone 
receives the same proportional income. Further it does not remain constant over time.  
Kakwani and Son (2004) have shown that it declines over time when growth takes place. So we 
denote this elasticity in year t by t θ δ  
If there were no universal pension or social assistance scheme, poverty will change 
between year t-1 and year t by  t g θ δ × × 100  percent. Then the poverty level in the tth year will 
be given by 
 
) 1 ( 1 t t t g θ δ θ θ × + = −                                      (9) 
 
Given the incidence poverty in the base year given by 0 θ , equation (9) can be used to 
calculate the incidence of poverty in any year. 
Since the poverty is affected by both growth and social assistance scheme, the poverty 
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) 1 ]( 1 [ 1 1 0 θ θ δ η ρ θ θ × + × × + = g PGDP t            (10) 
 
and for other years when t=2,3,------,n, it will be given by 
 
) 1 )]( 1 ( 1 [ 1 t t t t g g PGDP θ θ δ η ρ θ θ × + + × × × + = −         (11) 
 
Equation (11) takes account of the fact that when growth takes place, the more money is 
available every year for targeting.   
 
If we substitute g=0, when there is no growth in economy, (11) will lead to (6), in which 
case poverty will reduce only due the universal pension scheme. If we substitute  0 = ρ , when 
there is no pension scheme, in which case poverty will change only because of economic 
growth, (11) will lead to (9). Note that if growth is negative, poverty will increase. 
The United Nations has set eight millennium development goals, one of which is to 
reduce poverty to half in 25 years. Equation (11) should allow us to determine the social 
assistance rate (targeted not necessarily to the elderly, but to the most disadvantaged group in 
society) that will meet this goal. 
TARGETING SPECIFIC GROUPS 
The universal scheme may be too costly to operate. Another alternative is to target specific 
groups so that we achieve a maximum reduction in total poverty with given (limited) resources.    
Suppose that there are K mutually exclusive socio-economic groups in the population. 









θ θ                                                  (12) 
 
where  k a  is the population share of the kth group and  k θ is the poverty level in the kth group. 
This equation implies that the total poverty is the weighted average of poverty levels in 
different groups with weight proportional population shares. 
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where  θ η k is the absolute elasticity of poverty for the kth group. If everyone in the kth group 
received one unit of country’s currency, poverty in the kth group will change by 










*                                           (14) 
 
which implies that if everyone in the kth group receives one unit of country’s currency, then 
total poverty in the country will change by 
* 100 θ η k ×  percent. 
 
Suppose that we give pension only to individuals in the kth group and the total money 
available for distribution is  GDP × ρ  so every person in the kth group will receive a pension of 
k a PGDP/ × ρ  so the percentage reduction in total poverty in the country will be given by 
k k a PGDP / 100
*
θ η ρ × , which in view of (14) is equal to  θ η θ ρ θ / 100 k k PGDP × . As we 
demonstrated above, if we did the universal targeting, then with the same amount of money, 
the percentage reduction in poverty will be   θ η ρ × × PGDP 100 . This leads us to propose a 








k =                                             (15) 
 
If  k λ is greater than 1, we can say that with the same amount of money, targeting the kth 









1 λ                                         (16) 
 
which implies that the weighted average of target indicators of different groups with weight 
proportional to the population shares is equal to 1. It means that for some groups  k λ will be 
greater than one and for others it will be less than 1. The larger the value of  k λ , the greater will 
be the percentage poverty reduction for the kth group compared to the universal targeting. 
Thus, we can use  k λ  as a criterion for targeting a group.  
This analysis would be made operational using the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) 
poverty measures given in (2). We would present our empirical results for three members of 
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APPENDIX 2   
POVERTY LINES 
The study used the national poverty lines, which were obtained from various poverty 
assessment reports, which are listed below. These poverty lines are very crude and do not take 
account of different needs of household members by age and sex. They also do not take 
account of the economies of scale, which operate in large households. We modified these 
poverty lines using the following common methodology. 
1.  In many countries, the poverty lines were not available for the survey years. We used 
the consumer price index to adjust these lines so that they correspond to the survey 
years. 
2.  The national poverty lines obtained from poverty assessment reports were single 
poverty lines and thus made no allowance for different needs of household 
members, which do vary with age and sex. We made the decision that different 
needs of individuals can adequately be approximated by the calorie requirements, 
which are estimated for individuals of different age and sex. We obtained the calorie 
requirements that are widely used in Africa. These requirements are given in Table 
A1.The household surveys in each country had information on age and sex of each 
household member. We allocated the calorie requirements as given in Table A1 to 
each household member. Adding up the calorie requirements of each member and 
dividing by household size, we obtained the per calorie requirement of each 
household. We could then calculate the per capita calorie requirement of the whole 
population by the weighted average of the per capita calorie requirements with 
weights proportional to population of individuals represented by the sample 
households. These average calorie requirements, presented in table A2, vary across 
countries because of differences in countries’ population composition. .  
3.  Average poverty lines in the survey years as obtained in (1) were allocated to each 
household in proportion to their per capita calorie requirements so that average 
poverty line for the country as a whole is the same. The average poverty lines are 
presented in Col 2 of Table A2. 
4.  Finally we made an adjustment for the economies of scale. The larger householdswill 
have lower per capita poverty line than the smaller household. The economies of 
scale parameter was assumed to be equal to 0.7, which that the larger households 
will incur about 30 % less expenditure than the smaller households but still will enjoy 
the same utility level. Thus, the per capita poverty line for the ith household will be 
given by 
 
i i i n n apline k pline / ) ( ) (
7 . 0 =  
 
where k is the constant of proportionality and (alpine) is the average poverty line. 
 The parameter k is determined so that mean of  i pline) ( .across all households is 
equal to the average poverty line (alpine). This ensures that the adjustment for 
economies of scale does not change the mean of the poverty line.  Nanak Kakwani  and  Kalanidhi Subbarao  37 
 
TABLE A1 
Calorie requirements by age and sex 
   Age  Requirement 
Children  0 to 1  800 
   1 to 3  1300 
   4 to 6  1800 
   7 to 10  2000 
Males  11 to 14  2500 
   15 to 18  3000 
   19 to 50  2900 
   51+  2300 
Females  11 to 50  2200 
   51+  1900 
 
TABLE A2 
Average calorie requirements and poverty lines 
Country   Cal requirement  Poverty line 
Burundi   2150  63760 
Burkina Faso   2140  47736 
Burkina Faso   2152  53639 
Cote d'voire  2266  166758 
Camroon   2164  139186 
Ethiopia  2164  862 
Ghana   2192  680270 
Guinea  2140  291386 
Gambia   2191  2607 
Kenya  2147  10521 
Kenya  2198  13277 
Madagascar   2171  674128 
Madagascar   2178  766139 
Mozambique  2165  1859424 
Malawi   2188  3829 
Nigeria   2253  11285 
Uganda  2139  223118 
Zambia  2193  428305 
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TABLE A3 
Head count ratio by household types 















Burundi 98  61.6  67.5  58.6  59.0  61.4  59.8  61.2 
Burkina Faso 98  48.9  47.0  59.3  58.1  51.0  57.5  52.6 
Cote d'voire98  33.1  46.1  60.7  47.1  34.5  46.9  36.7 
Camroon 96  58.7  45.9  32.8  66.7  58.6  70.8  60.9 
Ethiopia00  40.3  42.4  42.3  43.5  40.1  45.2  40.9 
Ghana 98  40.9  32.4  57.7  52.1  42.2  49.6  43.6 
Guinea94  34.8  37.5  58.4  42.8  37.0  41.1  38.1 
Gambia 98  53.9  58.6  31.7  72.0  58.5  72.0  62.2 
Kenya97  47.9  45.4  55.2  59.3  48.1  58.8  49.7 
Madagascar 01  62.3  50.0  62.1  60.5  62.1  61.1  62.0 
Mozambique96  69.2  53.8  75.5  67.6  68.8  69.8  68.9 
Malawi 97  62.3  62.9  82.3  71.8  62.4  73.8  63.9 
Nigeria 96  61.6  34.3  64.2  72.8  62.5  67.9  63.4 
Uganda99  48.6  56.4  65.2  45.1  48.3  47.4  48.2 
Zambia98  64.4  72.0  90.2  78.6  64.8  80.1  66.7 
TABLE A4 
Percent reduction in total (national)  poverty gap  by targeting household  types: (.5 % of GDP) 












Burundi  98  1.16  0.85 0.97 1.08  1.16 1.06 
Burkina Faso 98  4.36  2.48  3.68  5.51  4.60  5.44 
Cote  d'voire98  4.31  3.94 7.47 6.86  4.58 6.62 
Cameroon  96  3.23  1.67 1.47 3.86  3.24 4.07 
Ethiopia00  1.92  1.41 1.70 2.04  1.92 2.06 
Ghana  98  1.94  1.00 2.50 2.54  2.02 2.33 
Guinea94  2.75  1.82 4.08 3.45  2.97 3.20 
Gambia  98  1.50  0.95 0.72 2.28  1.73 2.21 
Kenya97  2.43  1.58 2.47 3.06  2.44 2.92 
Madagascar  01  3.02  1.63 2.79 3.00  3.01 2.97 
Mozambique96  1.32  0.72 1.26 1.35  1.31 1.34 
Malawi  97  1.26  0.90 1.57 1.48  1.27 1.46 
Nigeria  96  2.45  0.98 2.33 3.10  2.51 2.79 
Uganda99  2.75  2.01 3.29 2.56  2.75 2.55 
Zambia98  1.40  1.07 1.74 1.76  1.41 1.75 
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SOURCES OF POVERTY LINES 
“Burkina Faso: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, Ministry of Economics and Finance, Burkina 
Faso, 25 May 2000 
“Burundi Poverty Note: Prospects for Social Protection in a Crisis Economy”, World Bank 
Document, February 1999 
“Cameroon: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, Republic of Cameroon, April 2003 
“Cote D’Ivoire: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, Republic of Cote D’Ivoire,  
January 2002 
“Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program”, Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, July 2002 
“1998 Household Survey Poverty Report”, Government of the Gambia, June 2000 
“Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s”, Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000 
“Guinea: A Socioeconomic Assessment of Well-Being and Poverty”, Document of the World 
Bank, March 31, 1997 
“Kenya: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2000-2003”, Government of Kenya,  
June 2000 
“Madagascar: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, Republic of Madagascar,  
November 2000 
“Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, Government of Malawi, April 2002 
“Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, December 2000 
“Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2001-2005) PARPA”, Republic of 
Mozambique, April 2001 
“Poverty Profile for Nigeria: 1985-1996”, Government of Nigeria, December 1998 
“Uganda: Poverty Status Report”, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; 
March 2001 
“Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2004”, Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, Lusaka, March 2002 40  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 8 
REFERENCES 
Case, Anne and Angus Deaton (1998) “Large Cash Transfers to the Elderly in South Africa”   
The Economic Journal, Vol.108 (September), pp. 1330-1361. 
Coady, David, M. Grosh and J. Hoddinott (2004) Targeting of Transfers in Developing Countries: 
Review of Lessons and Experience. The World Bank: Washington DC.  
Luc Christaensen and Kalanidhi Subbarao (2005) “Towards an Understanding of Vulnerability 
in Rural Kenya”  Journal of African Economies, forthcoming.   
Richard Disney (2003) “Africa in Crisis: Hazards Rise for Prime Age Adults”, The African 
Economist, Vol.6(17) August, p. 41.   
Kakwani, N. (1980) “On a Class of Poverty Measures” Econometrica, Vol 48, No 2, pp 437-446 
Kakwani, N., 1993. “Poverty and Economic Growth with Application to Cote D’Ivoire.” 
Review of Income and Wealth 39(2, June):121-39. 
Palacios, Robert J. and I. Rajan (2004). “Safety Nets for the Elderly in Poor Countries:  
The Case of Nepal”  Draft. The World Bank.  
Sen, A.K (1976),”Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement,” Econometrica , 46, 473-46  
Schwarz, Anita (2003) “Old Age Security and Social Pensions”, World Bank: Human 
Development (Social Protection) Hub:  Processed.  
Siaens, C., K. Subbarao and Q.T. Wodon (2003) Are Orphans Especially Vulnerable? Evidence 
from Rwanda.  The World Bank.  Draft. 
Smith, W. James and K. Subbarao (2003) “What Role for Safety Net Transfers in Very Low 
Income Countries?” World Bank: Social Protection Discussion Paper 301. 
Subbarao, Kalanidhi et. Al. (1997) Safety Net Programs and Poverty Reduction: Lessons from  
Cross-Country Experience (World Bank : Washington DC). 
Subbarao, Kalanidhi (1998) “Namibia’s Social Safety Net: Issues and Options for Reform”  
The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper No. 1996. 
Subbarao, Kalanidhi and Diane Coury (2004) Reaching Out to Africa’s Orphans: A Framework for 
Public Action :  The World Bank, Africa Human Development Publication (in print) 
Subbarao, Kalanidhi, M. Temourov and E.D. Tesliuc (2004):  Burkina Faso: Risk and Vulnerability 
Assessment.  The World Bank: Human Development Unit, Africa Region.  
World Bank (2004: “Ethiopia: Risk and Vulnerability Assessment” Draft. Processed.  
NOTES 
 
1. See Kalanidhi Subbarao and Diane Coury, Reaching Out to Africa’s Orphans:  A Framework for Public Action, 
(2004): The World Bank: Africa Human Development publication (in press)   
2. The household survey information for Burkina Faso and Guinea belong to 1994, and that of Cameroon to 1996. 
3. While the welfare profile in section III is done with the elderly defined as 60+, the costing and targeting 
simulations in section IV are carried out with two elderly groups: 60+ and 65+.  
4. “Head count poverty” is defined as the percentage of population below the national poverty line.  “Poverty gap 
ratio” is defined as the mean income shortfall below the poverty line as a proportion of the national poverty line. 
5. We are presenting only national level aggregates.  It is just possible that there are significant intra-country 
differences.  An analysis of intra-country differences is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6. It is difficult to verify whether actually this definition has been followed in all surveys. 
7. For actual numbers behind Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 are given in Appendix Table A3. 
8. For details, see see studies by World Bank (2004), L. Christiaensen and K. Subbarao (2005) and K. Subbarao, M. 
Temourov and E.D. Tesliuc (2004). 
9. Poverty gap ratio is defined as the mean income shortfall below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty 
line with non-poor having zero income shortfalls. 
10. It is difficult to estimate the amount spent on the elderly because the Government runs both a pension 
program and also an in-kind Annapoorna (food distribution) program. 
11. For purposes of this simulation, we are abstracting from the administrative costs of targeting which 
undoubtedly will be incurred, both for identifying the elderly, and the poor among the elderly. 
12. Bearing in mind fiscal affordability and sustainability over time, it is not surprising  that countries such as India 
have restricted the old age pension only to the poor among the elderly. 
13. There is only limited experience with respect to social pension programs in Africa, and evaluations of such 
experience is even scarcer.  Two notable exceptions are South Africa and Namibia. The eligibility for the South 
African social pension program is determined by age.  So it is simple to administer though the requirement of birth 
certificates might exclude some eligible individuals.  An evaluation by Case and Deaton (1998) has shown that the 
program, though universal, is largely pro-poor, and women benefited more than men due to the higher life 
expectancies of the former over the latter.  Their analysis of behavioral responses is not definitive.  Subbarao (1996) 
noted that the eligibility for the Namibian social pension program is also determined by age, and is largely pro-
poor.  However, exclusion errors were pervasive due to its complex, and documentation-intensive registration 
procedures. The experience thus far in Africa is limited to middle income countries where affordability is less of a 
concern.  However, in low income African countries where competition for scarce resources is fierce, universal 
(untargeted) social pensions is neither desirable on welfare grounds nor is it  fiscally sustainable.  For an overview 
of targeting approaches, see Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott.(2004).    
14. See R. Palacios and S.I. Rajan (2004) “Safety Nets for the Elderly in Poor Countries: The Case of Nepal”, Draft. The 
World Bank.  
15. A similar gender disadvantage in schooling was obtained for Rwanda by Siaens, Subbarao and Wodon (2004) 
where it was shown that orphaned girl children fostered by female headed households were less likely to be in 
school than others. 
16. As Subbarao et. Al. (1997) study noted, “screeing out the poorest (exclusion errors) is a bigger problem than 
including the non-poor (inclusion errors) in the targeting of any safety net transfer program; too much fine tuning 
in targeting may actually hurt the poor if the program loses political support.    
17. See Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004). 
18. These experiences will be analyzed as soon as follow-up survey information is collected.  
19. This class of measures exclude Sen’s (1976) and Kakwani(1980) poverty measures, which are based on 
interdependent utility function and therefore are not additively separable. International Poverty Centre
SBS – Ed. BNDES,10o  andar
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